The strengthening of regulatory requirements, along with evolution in banking regulations, can have a negative impact on the external bank financing of emerging countries heavily dependent on this type of financing. Indeed, several studies have aroused fears about the potential effects of significant regulatory adjustments on bank lending to emerging markets. This paper presents a trial to estimate the sensitivity of the banking flows to increased regulatory requirements. We adopt a macroeconomic approach based on the determinants of cross-border banking claims flows from banks located in 19 developed countries to 37 emerging countries. The results of the GMM estimation confirm the negative impact of regulatory requirements on the banking flows to emerging countries, the significant impact of business openness and the negative effect of bank financialization on banking flows to these countries. The results also show that countries rated as speculative grade are influenced by the regulatory requirements, unlike countries rated in investment grade category.
Introduction
Given the importance of capital flows in the financing of emerging countries and the increasing regulatory requirements, several studies have aroused fears about the potential effects of significant regulatory adjustments on bank lending to emerging markets. Indeed, the reduction of regulatory arbitrage opportunities can change the structure of banking flows to emerging countries. This structure has been greatly influenced by evolutions in prudential regulation. Basel I was characterized by simple categorization based on OECD membership countries which gave a wide margin of arbitration. Banks could hold risky assets without regulatory coverage such as short-term assets of OECD emerging countries (Bisignano, 2003) . These arbitrages have fueled massive banking flows to emerging countries before the 1997 crisis. Indeed, 64% of bank flows to five countries in crisis were short-term in 1997 (Figuet & Lahet, 2007) . In 1999, after publishing the first proposal of Basel II, the Basel Committee received several concerns about its negative effects on lending to risky entities in lower rating category ex: SMEs and emerging countries. The last financial shock has highlighted the weaknesses of this legislation. Therefore, the Basel Committee has proposed a new regulatory framework, Basel III, to strengthen the solvency and liquidity of banks in case of shocks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Due to capital requirements even higher under Basel III, banking flows might know a tightening due to increased costs and limited risk-taking.
As financing conditions become increasingly restricted with new regulatory reforms, these countries, in need of financing, offset the decline in banking flows in financial markets, which remain volatile and depend on market cycles. Indeed, the tightening of bank financing is part of the current debate around the change in the external financing structure of emerging countries, with the increase of financing in the bonds market to the detriment of bank financing. On the other hand, access to this type of financing requires a fairly developed market, which is not the case for all emerging countries. In this context, this paper attempts to provide some answers to the question of the new prudential regulations effects on the banking flows to emerging countries. We use a macroeconomic approach in order to test the regulatory requirements as a determinant of banking flows to emerging countries under the push and pull factors.
In the best of our knowledge, no paper discusses this question in such way. Firstly, as no specific data is yet available for capital requirements we integrate variables reflecting 3 regulation ratio to consider the effect of the regulation through the effect of these criteria.
Secondly, based to Weder & Wedow (2002) paper who attempted to evaluate ex-ante the impact of Basel II requirements over the period 1993-2001, we evaluate ex-post the capital requirements changes. This method permits the association of risk with regulatory requirements. So, this allows for a detailed analysis of sensitivity to regulatory requirements based on the level of risk. To conduct our empirical assessment, we use cross border data of international banking claims from 19 developed countries to 37 emerging countries, provided by the Bank for international settlements, and ratings to estimate risk, provided by Standard & Poor's, used in the evaluation of regulatory requirements.
Comparing the results of the two estimates with GMM for both periods 1990-2006 and 2007-2014 confirms the significant effect of banking regulations on the banking flows to emerging markets through the significance weighting criteria, the OECD membership for Basel I period and the rating for the Basel II period. The results confirm also the negative impact of regulatory requirements on the banking flows to emerging countries, the significant impact of business openness and the negative effect of bank financialization on banking flows to these countries. Moreover, the results show that countries rated in the speculative grade category are influenced by the regulatory requirements, contrary to countries rated in investment grade category.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 present the structure of capital flows to emerging countries and their relation with banking regulation evolution. Section 3 presents the literature review of the banking regulation as an important push or pull factor of these flows. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the empirical model and results. Section 6 concludes.
Banking flows to emerging countries and banking regulation. What link?
Despite the current crisis, the emerging economies still know exceptional growth levels and significant capital flows. Several factors played a positive role in improving the financial situation of these countries. Indeed, after the 1997 crisis, emerging countries try to stabilize and increase the level of confidence in their markets. They are increasing foreign exchange reserves, improving economic fundamentals and the risk-return relationship to be more competitive in terms of capital flows attractiveness. This is through the intervention of elements which reduce the risk such as: the stabilization of inflation or other elements that increase yields as institutional reforms for more open markets. Consequently, the overall situation appears strengthened. Nevertheless, when taken separately, several countries are still ensuring financial stability. These too simple principles seem unable to correctly measure the banking risks.
Therefore, the overhaul of prudential regulation focuses on more sophisticated methods of calculating risks. The Basel II agreement adopts a menu of options to differentiate more finely borrower's level of risk and capital requirements, to cover always a rate of 8%. However, some economists call into question the effectiveness of Basel II agreement because of its procyclical effect and too stringent regulatory requirements for risky entities (SMEs and lowerrated countries). Indeed, the increased requirements for capital strengthening economic cycles may have a destabilizing macroeconomic impact if the decline of credit is not substitutable by other funding sources.
The new Basel agreement further strengthens the regulatory capital requirements in quantity and quality. The minimum requirements for common equity increased from 2% to 4.5% with the introduction of a conservation buffer of 2.5% of active funds, the establishment of countercyclical capital reserves of 2.5% -to contain the excessive accumulation of leverageand the introduction of threshold leverage. This significant cost could push banks to increase the credit rate and reduce their loan allocation levels, which can create a drag on economic activity and the level of investment. An effect that highly disrupts dependent markets such as banking flows to emerging markets especially those have not an alternative financing.
Literature review
The literature review consists in three main parts; the first one focuses on the general framework on the determinants of the banking flows to emerging countries. The second part, discuss the role of banking regulation as pull or push factor of the banking flows. The third part deals with the effects of regulatory requirements on bank flows to emerging countries.
3.1.Determinants of banking flows to emerging countries
The emerging countries have experienced a great return of capital flows after 2003, a return explained by changes in economic fundamentals of these countries as well as the abundance of international liquidity. The level of favorable performance in emerging economies is one of the determinants of banking flows that are classified into two categories: Pull and Push determinants (Calvo & al, 1993; Fernandez-Arias, 1996) . The external factors (push)
represent the disadvantage to investing in developed countries with low yields pushing liquidity to emerging countries. The internal factors (pull) are the favorable economic 7 situation in emerging countries that attract liquidity to these markets. But the relationship between these factors and capital flows remain ambiguous because of the complex interaction between them.
External or push factors are the unfavorable situation in countries originating of banking flows pushing these capitals to emerging countries. The origin of these flows is mainly developed countries that have excess liquidity, low yields and low interest rates. Several studies, as Calvo & al. (1993) , Montiel & Reinhart (1999) , Kim (2000) , Ying & Kim (2001) , Ferrucci & al. (2004) , confirm the influence of these factors on the direction of financial flows. Research on push factors of bank flows focus on developed countries GDP as Jeanneau & Micu (2002) and S&P 500 as Broto & al. (2008) . Other factors are recently discussed as push factor such as the cost of bank flows and contagion.
Internal or pull factors are the internal factors reflect the economic performance of a country which makes it more attractive in terms of investment as the economic fundamentals, growth rate, interest rate, inflation, …etc. Several studies such as -Fernandez-Aria (1996), Bohn & Tesar (1998) showed the importance of these factors as determinants of capital flows to developing countries. The stability of exchange rates, political stability and trade openness also are factors that may favor some countries in terms of attractiveness of flows. Few studies, on determinants of foreign bank lending, focused on risk aversion, interest rate and economic growth (Jeanneau & Micu, 2002) . After the last crisis, several studies have highlighted the disruptive effects of fluctuations in capital flows by identifying the episodes of sudden stops and surges as; Ghosh & al. (2014) ; Forbes & Warnock, (2012) ; Reinhart & Reinhart, (2008) .
Therefore, several studies have been conducted within this context. Nevertheless, the literature, on the determinants of banking flows under the pull and push factors to emerging countries, remains limited and focus mainly on traditional variables: interest rate and economic growth (Figuet & al., 2015) . Other studies, Jeanneau & Micu (2002) , Heid & al. (2004) ; Forbes & Warnock (2012) ; Bruno & Shin (2015) , concentrate on risk aversion variable such as yield spread and VIX. They show the strong correlation between capital flows and the level of risk. Ghosh & al. (2011) discuss the factors that determine banking flows from advanced economies to emerging markets in the context of global factors push and pull. The results show that the impact varies considerably depending on the region. Bruno & Shin (2013) and Rey (2013) show that banking sector capital flows are strictly associated with US monetary policy. 
Banking regulation: push or pull factor?
Basel III is the result of improvements experienced by prudential regulation based on Basel II imperfections revealed by the 2007 crisis. These reforms are supposed reduce the frequency or intensity of financial crises, covering both; micro-prudential measures that strengthen banks' resilience to shocks and macro-prudential measures to strengthen the banking system.
These measures limit the pro-cyclicality and risk interdependence between institutions. So, this bank regulation should have a positive impact on the stability of banking systems.
However, the implementation of this new agreement gives rise to concerns about the effects on the costs of its application. This can lead banks to reduce their credit offers by increasing capital cost. Therefore, it may cause a slowdown in economic activity and a reduction in the level of liquidity in the country which adopts this regulation and flows of this country to emerging countries. It is '' the financial flows channel '' through direct and indirect effects on banking flows (Ghosh & al. 2011 ).
Banking regulation is an important factor in banking flows at national or international level through its influence on the banks behavior. Regulatory requirements are an additional cost and can influence the volume of loans and their costs. Capital level change effects can create shocks in the banking market; the regulator has taken into account this change through the gradual establishment by 2019 to allow time for banks to accumulate more capital with the retained earnings. Nevertheless, on the capital market this can cause a significant increase in capital costs: the IIF report (2012) estimate that financial markets would be less elastic with this new agreement. Therefore, the emerging economic equity markets may be affected through several channels, even excluding the application of Basel III by the emerging countries. The first channel is the ''trade flows channel'' due to the economic activity decrease in developed countries. Indeed, the implementation of Basel III in developed countries affects the supply of credit and slowing economic activity, imports and trade. This is the effect of Basel III on the developed countries to emerging countries transmitted through the foreign trade channel. The second is the financial channel (Ghosh & al. 2011 ) which results of lower banking flows to emerging countries through increased capital costs and the decline in interest rate spreads. This channel is composed of two small channels; the first is the effect of the reduction in direct bank loans from developed countries to non-banking institutions in emerging countries. This has a direct effect on investment in these countries. The second channel represents indirect effects on these markets through lower lending to banks in emerging countries. These effects can be enhanced by asymmetric information and problems 9 of country risk assessment by the rating agencies. Moreover, the impact of the decrease in banking flows to emerging countries on the financing of these markets depends on the level of diversification of funding sources and access to capital markets. Small and medium companies can find themselves in trouble compared to large companies that can offset the lack of funding by access to financial markets that has evolved after the 1990s. In these countries, effects may be different from one country to another, depending on their level of independence on banking flows.
The importance of capital flows in the convergence of emerging countries incomes and the importance of financial channel in the transmission of shocks leads us to study the effects of this channel on the capital markets. In this context, the role of banking regulation remains ambiguous to classify it as pull or push factor. It influences the arbitration of international investors in two ways: it can push banking flows through the increase in capital costs, thus decreasing profitability flows to emerging countries, or attract these flows by improving the ratings of these countries.
Empirical studies
Regarding the literature on regulatory requirements, few works have treated its effects on the stability of emerging funding. Van Hoose (2007) shows that it is generally accepted in the theoretical academic literature that the immediate effects of the capital requirements can reduce total loans and increase loan rates. It was not until the 2000s that the subject began to attract economist studies despite the important role played by Basel I in amplifying the 1997 crisis. Bisignano (2003) ; Buch & al. (2003) show that Basel I favored the short-term financing to emerging countries. As for Basel II, few studies reported negative effects on banking flows to emerging countries such as Reisen (2001) . He argued that borrowers speculative grade of most emerging and developing countries, would suffer a dramatic rise in debt costs and increased cyclicality of the global banking credit due to Basel II. Griffith-Jones & Spratt (2001) also confirm that Basel II will have a likely negative effect on developing countries.
Other economists confirm that Basel II will have a negligible effect on the financing of emerging countries. Weder & Wedow (2002) address this issue by calculating a measure of the economic capital variation and test its influence on the banking flows of BIS reporting banks. Liebig & al. (2007) , by adopting a micro perspective, calculate the level of bank regulatory capital and the unexpected loss using a value to risk model. This measurement is then tested in a dynamic panel model on the determinants of claims to emerging markets. The results show that there will be a negligible effect on lending by German banks to emerging markets. Liebig & al. (2007) , Claessens & al. (2008) , estimate that the Basel II effect on the financing of emerging countries is negligible. About the new Basel III, literature remains limited in some authors', which seems to confirm the negative impact of this agreement on the levels of bank lending in the world. Elliot (2009) shows that it is likely to be relatively small changes on the lending volumes of US banks due to higher capital requirements. As well Frenkel & Rudolph (2010) examine the macroeconomic and financial effects of the leverage ratio and prove that it will have a significant economic impact. This is likely to lead to a reduction of loans and thus a slowdown in economic activity. They also offer an extensive transition period to avoid these side effects. Others find different results that depend on the characteristics of each economy as Cosimano & Hakura (2011) . They confirm that the increase in regulatory requirements under Basel III will push banks to increase their lending rates and reduce the level of credit supply. However, this varies considerably from an advanced economy to another according to equity and elasticity of demand for loans in relation to changes in loan rates. On the other hand, Solvik (2011) shows that more stringent capital requirements on the basis of risk-weighted assets are intended to increase the capacity of the banking system to absorb losses, but also increase banks' incentives to circumvent regulations. Houston & al. (2012) confirm that differences in banking regulation may be important push or pull factors for cross-border bank claims. The introduction of a leverage ratio based on the unweighted total assets helps to harmonize the activities of banks with their main economic functions and to maximize capital -allocation-efficiency, even if the common argument against a strict leverage ratio is that it increases the cost of bank loans and hurts the economy. Figuet & al. (2015) show the significant effect of different components of Basel III on the level of banking flows to emerging countries. They use statistics of capital requirement of 500 international banks. This method separates the level of risk from regulatory requirements, which does not allow the detection of categories of countries that will not be affected by the strengthening of regulatory requirements.
This literature review has been prepared in order to present reflection elements concerning the issue of banking flows vulnerability to emerging countries. A deductive reading literature about, on one side, the banking flows determinants to emerging countries, and on the other side, the banking regulation role in the supply of bank financing to these countries confirm '' theoretically '' the role of banking regulation as banking flows determinant to emerging countries without providing a unanimous empirical answer to the question. In this paper we 11 intend to assess the impact of regulatory requirements as push factors on cross border banking claims to 37 emerging markets.
Measurements and estimation procedure
Our estimation of the prudential regulations impact on bank lending to emerging markets use modeling of banks' lending decisions through the push and pulls factors, which constitute the general framework of our empirical test. With this aim, we must develop a model of international bank lending. Most of the existing literatures on international capital flows have adopted a macroeconomic approach, focusing on the push and pull factors determinants of banking flows. However, these studies use data aggregated by creditor countries which does not allow a detailed analysis of the behavior of individual banks. Thus, to test the sensitivity of banking flows to regulatory requirements, we are adopting a macroeconomic approach. On the basis of the push and pull models of banking flows, we are trying to integrate regulatory requirements as a determining factor of these flows. We try to assess these regulation requirements as a quantitative variable.
Regulatory requirements related to credit risk still represent 8% of the risk-weighted assets under Basel I and Basel II. The difference between these two regulations lies in the weights which are primarily related to the OECD membership under Basel I and related to risks under Basel II. Thus, we try firstly to see the effects of these two criteria on the banking flows to emerging countries before and after the implementation of Basel II. Subsequently, we try to estimate the sensitivity of these flows with regulatory requirements through the weights applied under Basel II. These weights represent risk-weighted assets as a percentage of outstanding capital and represents 12.5 of the level of minimum capital requirements. 
Calculation of interest variable: the risk weights with the IRB approach under Basel II
Under the IRB approach, four risk indicators are defined: 1. PD is the default probability: the risk weights are calculated 5 using the default probabilities associated with sovereign ratings of
Standard & Poor's as a proxy to internal ratings. Since the study focuses on annual changes in international bank claims, we take the default probabilities on one year out forecast in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem. 2. M is the credit maturity, which is fixed at 1 year for the same reasons. 3. EAD is the exposure to default which represents the amount due credit.
4.
LGD is the loss given default that fixed at 50%. 
Model specification
We opt for push and pull factors models which consider the key factors that determine the level and direction of banking flows. The choice of empirical modeling is conform to empirical studies on these factors. The model is represented as follows:
, the cross-border banking claims from 19 developed countries to the emerging country i in each period t, , the dependent lagged variable with the corresponding coefficient, , represents all push variables with the vector of corresponding coefficients, represents all pull variables with the vector of corresponding coefficients; the fixed effect, the time fixed effect and , the term error.
As part of the dynamic panel, the generalized method of moments (GMM) appears to be the most appropriate choice for three reasons; the explanatory variable endogeneity, the low temporal dimension in the model and the individual effects resulting from the heterogeneity in the emerging countries group. countries available in the database of the basic variables, i.e. the default probability, which allows us to evaluate changes in regulatory requirements for these countries and cross-border international banking claims. The excluded countries are not retained for non-compliance in the period, or data unavailability. In total, a sample of 37 countries is retained (Appendix 2)
representing all geographic regions of emerging countries over 1990-2014.
Variables
After selecting the countries included in the study and the temporal dimension, we consider the problem of the variables selection that best fits with the objective of our test, specifically the variables that influence banking flows to these countries. We hold variables widely used in the literature on the subject. Data used in the model are defined in appendix 1 
Pull factors:
GDP is the first indicator of country development. We use GDP per capita to remove the effect of the country size (Ghosh & al., 2011; Figuet & al., 2015) . The competitiveness in terms of profitability as measured by the differential in real interest rates between emerging countries and the United States (Jeanneau & Micu, 2002; Figuet & al., 2015) . The degree of trade openness measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP and variables reflecting the weighting criteria in the regulations, OECD membership and rating. These criteria are indicators of the country solvability. OECD membership and good credit rating score are an attractive factor for capital flows.
Push factors:
GDP per capita in developed countries to indicate prosperity pushing these countries to offer more funds (Jeanneau & Micu, 2002; Ghosh & al., 2011; Figuet & al., 2015) . We include the attractiveness of financial markets as a proxy of profitability in the financial markets through the Standard & Poor's 500 index (Broto & al., 2008; Figuet & al., 2015) and VIX (Volatility Index) to measures market expectation of volatility. Finally, we consider the weights related to bank claims that reflect the bank credit cost.
Result analysis
We conduct the empirical test in four steps in two periods and by groups of variables. We begin with the baseline model with traditional push and pull variables (column 1) and then, one by one with variable representing criteria of bank regulation under Basel I (column 2) and Basel II (column 3). Then, we combine these two variables (column 4). Finally, as a robustness test we change variables control (column 5). All estimates show that the lagged variable is very significant with a positive coefficient sign (table 1) . This strong significance reflects the continuity in the behavior of the supply of credit, which can be explained by pattern and familiarity of the borrower.
As for macroeconomic factors, the pull factors determine the banking flows to emerging countries with a highly significant GDP per capita (with a positive and significant coefficient at 1% and 5%), unlike the per capita GDP of developed countries which doesn't seem to play a role in the behavior of lending to emerging countries. The differential in interest rate does not seem have a significant role, which consist with the literature (Weder & Wedew, 2002; Liebig & al., 2007; Broto & al., 2008; Figuet & al., 2015) . Iftekhar & al. (2015) , confirming the weight of ratings after the implementation of Basel II in the credits flows to emerging countries. Concerning the exchange rate variable, the effect is tested but not reported, it is not significant for both periods. Indeed, bank loans may be more sensitive to exchange rate expectations than the real exchange rate. Standard errors in parenthesis: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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As credit risk assessment remains unchanged (BCBS, 2010) still calculated with IRB model and given the adjustments required for credit risk under Basel III 8 , the level of minimum regulatory requirements increase from 8% to 10.5% or even 13% if we consider the countercyclical buffer (Table 3) . This corresponds to an increase of 2.5% to 5% regulatory requirements, inducing an increase of 31.25% to 62.5% of the weighted assets credit risk percentage. Considering the coefficient (-0.0391) of the last estimate (Table 2) , this increase induces a decrease of 1.22% to 2.44% of bank claims to emerging countries. Moreover, these countries will not be affected on the same level by this increase of regulatory requirements. A priori, countries with lower ratings will be more affected. Besides, regulatory requirements do not only dependent on the solvency ratio; rating has a negative or positive effect in determining the level of regulatory requirements. The deterioration or improvement, such as: the deterioration of the rating B to -B causes an increase of 33.5264% of risk weighted assets which, in our estimation, and considering the same level of regulatory requirements, can induce a fall in banking flows of 1.31%.
Conversely, the improved rating, from -B to B, increases the banking flows by 1.31%. (Table 5) , this increase induces a decrease of 5.65% to 11.31% of bank claims to speculative grade emerging countries. However, this can have a positive effect by encouraging these countries to develop alternative financing on capital markets and to stabilize their external financing.
Results in table 5 show that, for investment grade countries, regulatory requirements do not seem play a significant role in the determination of banking flows. This reflects the low level of regulatory requirements for this category. For control variables, lagged variable and GDP for emerging countries seem influence positively and significantly banking flows. Financial markets, through SP500 and VIX, seem have a significant and negative effect on the volume of banking flows and this is the same for trade openness. For countries rated in the speculative category, regulatory requirements are the only variable that seems to play a role in determining bank flows with the lagged variable. This shows the importance of these requirements so high that the other control variables no longer have any effect. As a final point, for both categories, differential interest rate and GDP for developed countries do not affect banking flows to emerging market.
As a robustness test for all estimations and with the same steps, we use static and dynamic feasible generalized least squares model (appendix 8). All tests confirm the significances and signs of each variable and period with the GMM model. These results provide an overall estimate of the effects of regulatory requirements under Basel III on bank claims to emerging countries, but their analysis must be cautious because firstly, they do not take into account the impact of the liquidity and the leverage ratio. Secondly, they will depend on the level of regulatory requirements actually applied by the banks. However, other studies have dealt with the effect of these ratios that joins our results such as Houston & al. (2012) . They confirm that the introduction of a leverage ratio based on the unweighted total assets harmonize the activities of banks with their main economic functions and to maximize capital -allocation-efficiency, but a strict leverage ratio increases the cost of bank loans and hurts the economy. Otherwise, the paper does not take into account the dependence on the wholesale market to control the drying up of interbank dollar markets, which appear to have played an important role in the dynamics of international bank lending Peter, 2012 and McCauley & .
Conclusion
The high-level growth in emerging countries promises of higher equity returns. Nevertheless, these expectations will not be full filed without the large capital flows from rich countries in capital to the developed economies. While strengthening regulatory requirements, changes in banking regulation affect the structure of external financing of emerging countries. Indeed, the results of the GMM estimation confirm the negative and significant effect of the regulatory requirements levels on the banking flows towards emerging countries. Therefore, adjustments of regulatory requirements under Basel III result in restrainment of banking flows to emerging countries. However, this decline may be offset by an improvement in the level of risk in these countries or be strengthened by a drop in ratings. On the other hand, given that the banking flows to lower rated countries are more sensitive to this increase in regulatory requirements, emerging countries are encouraged to improve their ratings. The results confirm also, the significant impact of business openness and the negative effect of bank financialization on banking flows to these countries.
Consequently, emerging countries offset this decline in banking flows by financing on the financial markets, which remain highly volatile. Nevertheless, for less developed countries that do not have access to financial markets, decline in banking flows will have an impact on the financing of investment and growth. Note: * significant at p < 0.01
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Appendix 6 Observations 848 R-squared 0.053 Notes: BASELDUM is a dummy variable that takes the values of 0 for the Basel I period (1990 Basel I period ( -2006 and the value of 1 for the Basel II period (2007 -2014 
